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The Resource Curse Hypothesis Revisited: Evidence from a
Panel VAR
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to revisit the resource curse hypothesis both within and
between countries of different democratic footprint, based on a dynamic model that properly
accounts for endogeneity issues. To achieve that, we apply a panel Vector Auto-Regressive
(PVAR) approach along with panel impulse response functions to data on oil abundance vari-
ables, economic growth and several political institutional variables in 76 countries classified
by different income groupings, level of development and oil importing or exporting status,
over the period 1980-2012. Our results suggest that controlling for the quality of political in-
stitutions is important in rendering the resource course hypothesis significant. Doing so, the
resource curse hypothesis is documented mainly for developing economies, net oil-exporters
and medium-high income countries. Specifically, when economies from the aforementioned
groups are characterised by weak quality of political institutions, then oil abundance is not
growth-enhancing.
Keywords: Resource curse, Oil abundance, Economic growth, Institutions, Panel VAR
JEL codes: C33, O47, Q32, Q33
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1 Introduction
In their 1995 influential study titled “Natural resource abundance and economic growth”, Sachs
and Warner started a well-known line of research focusing on natural resources. They obtained
a negative conditional relationship between economic growth and resource dependence using a
cross section of international data, in line with the resource curse hypothesis. More specifically,
they report that economies with abundant natural resources tend to experience lower economic
growth compared to economies with scarce natural resources. Sachs and Warner (1999, 2001),
Gylfason et al. (1999) and Rodriguez and Sachs (1999), among many others, also find a neg-
ative relationship between growth and resource abundance.1 However, the evidence in favour
of the resource curse hypothesis is by no means conclusive (see, for example, Raddatz, 2007;
Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Alexeev and Conrad, 2009; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010,
among others).2 Alexeev and Conrad (2009), for example, demonstrate that high endowments
of oil have a positive effect on per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), contradicting most of
the empirical literature on the resource curse, while Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) find that
resource dependence does not negatively affect growth and they define the resource curse as a red
herring. However, Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) challenge the results of Brunnschweiler
and Bulte (2008) by raising the issues of endogeneity along with other mispesification issues.
In this study we revisit the resource curse hypothesis in an attempt to shed more light into
that field. The resource curse hypothesis literature reveals the following empirical regularities.
First, natural resource abundance is associated with various negative development outcomes
(Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999, 2001), although the opposite evidence is still present (Alexeev
and Conrad, 2009).
Second, existing explanations for the resource curse do not adequately account for the role of
social forces or external political and economic environments in shaping development outcomes
in resource abundant countries, nor for the fact that, while most resource abundant countries
have performed poorly in developmental terms (i.e., the cases of Angola and Congo, rich in oil,
or the group of OPEC countries) a few have done quite well (i.e., Norway).
Third, recommendations for overcoming the resource curse have not generally taken into
account the issue of political feasibility. More generally, it is argued that the basic problem
with the literature is that researchers have been too reductionist they have tended to explain
development performance solely in terms of the size and nature of countries natural resource
1Previously, Gelb (1988) and Auty (2002) also documented this relationship.
2See, for example, Frankel (2010) and van der Ploeg (2011) for recent surveys.
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endowments. A consensus is emerging that various political and social variables mediate the
relationship between natural resource wealth and development outcomes (i.e., Isham et al., 2005;
Mehlum et al., 2006a,b; Andersen and Aslaksen, 2008; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010; Bjorvatn
et al., 2012; Collier and Goderis, 2012; El Anshasy and Katsaiti, 2013). Even more, most of
the studies have not fully addressed the issue of endogeneity and reverse causality between the
variables of interest (Collier and Goderis, 2012). In this paper, we address all the above issues
when analyzing the resource curse hypothesis.
Thus, the objective of this paper is to re-examine the dynamic links of the resource curse
hypothesis both within and between countries of different democratic footprint. To achieve
this, we apply a panel Vector Auto-Regressive (PVAR) approach along with panel impulse
response functions to data on oil abundance (approximated by oil rents as a percentage of GDP,
oil share as a percentage of GDP and oil revenue per capita), economic growth and several
political institutional variables (i.e., polity IV index and its sub-indices and the political rights
index), together with additional control variables. We consider 76 countries classified by different
income groupings, level of development, oil importing/exporting status, as well as, their level
of democracy over the period 1980-2012, making this study the most comprehensive and most
up-to-date on the resource curse hypothesis.
Two are the main contributions of the paper to previous existing economic literature. First,
as far as the methodology is concerned, instead of using previous methodological approaches such
as cross-section (Sachs and Warner, 1995, and many others), panel data (Bhattacharyya and
Hodler, 2010; Boyce and Emery, 2011; Cavalcanti et al., 2011; Bjorvatn et al., 2012), panel error
correction models (Collier and Goderis, 2012) or time-varying cointegration (Apergis and Payne,
2014) models, in this paper we estimate different panel VAR models. To our knowledge, this is
the first paper that adopts a panel VAR approach and panel impulse response analysis to study
the dynamic impact among oil abundance, the quality of political institutions, and economic
growth by taking into account the endogeneity of these variables, as well as controlling for
commonly used variables in the endogenous economic growth theory.
The advantages of using a panel VAR methodology relative to methods previously discussed
so as to examine the resource curse hypothesis are several. First, and in contrast to cross-country,
panel data models allow us to control for unobservable time-invariant country characteristics,
reducing concerns of omitted variable bias. Second, time fixed effects can also be added to
account for any global (macroeconomic) shocks that may affect all countries in the same way.
Third, the inclusion of lags of the variables helps to analyze the dynamic relationship between
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the different variables. Thus, impulse response functions based on PVARs can account for any
delayed effects on and of the variables under consideration and thus determine whether the
effects between the variables of interest are short-lived, long-lived or both. Such dynamic effects
would not have been captured by panel regressions. Fourth, and most importantly, (P)VARs
are explicitly designed to address the endogeneity problem, which is one of the most serious
challenges of the empirical research on the resource curse hypothesis, by treating all variables as
potentially endogenous.3 Last but not least, PVARs can be effectively employed with relative
short-time series due to the efficiency gained from the cross-sectional dimension.
Our second contribution concerns the variables that are employed in this study. More specif-
ically, we include three key variables, namely, oil abundance (proxied by three alternative indica-
tors discussed in detail in the Section 3.1.), economic growth and institutional quality, together
with other commonly used control variables that can potentially affect economic growth (i.e.,
labor force participation, gross fixed capital formation, foreign direct investment and openness).
The inclusion of all these variables, together with their interactions (please see Section 3.1. for
details), will allow us to account for the interdependencies among the quality of political insti-
tutions, economic growth and oil abundance. In order to better characterize the relationship
between these variables, we also estimate the PVAR for different sub-groups of countries based
on different characteristics, such as, income level, developing stage and their oil exporting or
importing status, so as to check whether the impact of institutional quality and oil abundance
variables on economic growth potentially differs among each of these sub-groups of countries.
The results of our empirical analysis, which remain sound to several robustness checks, re-
veal the following empirical regularities. A positive relationship between resource abundance
and economic growth is documented for the overall sample. Put differently, the resource course
hypothesis is not present in the above case. However, controlling for the quality of political
institutions seems important in rendering the resource course hypothesis significant. Doing
so, we find evidence of the resource curse hypothesis, mainly for developing economies, net
oil-exporters and medium-high income countries. Specifically, when economies from the afore-
mentioned groups are characterised by weak quality of political institutions, then oil abundance
3The endogeneity problem in cross-country and panel data models has been previously addressed by the
inclusion of different instrumental variables (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009; Cotet and Tsui, 2013), and by estimating
the model using 2 or 3 Step Least Squares models (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke,
2010; Busse and Gro¨ning, 2013), Generalized Method of Moments (Lederman and Maloney, 2003; Maloney and
Lederman, 2008) or Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments (Yaduma et al., 2013). The difficulty in
measuring good instruments of the variables included in these types of studies, such as oil abundance and quality
of institutions, better justifies the use of panel VAR models, which help to alleviate the endogeneity problem by
treating all variables as potentially endogenous.
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is not growth-enhancing.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature
on oil abundance, economic growth and democracy. Section 3 presents the PVAR methodology
and the data set. Empirical results based on alternative estimations are presented in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Resource abundance, economic growth and the quality of in-
stitutions: A brief review
The importance of the quality of institutions in the relationship between natural resource abun-
dance and economic growth has already been addressed in the literature (Frankel, 2010). In
addition, the positive impact of the quality of the institutions and democracy on economic
growth has also been documented in many papers (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Barro, 1999;
Epstein et al., 2006; Glaeser et al., 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2008).
Furthermore, the interaction between natural resources and economic growth, taking into
account the role of institutions has been previously studied by Isham et al. (2005), Mehlum et al.
(2006a), Mehlum et al. (2006b), Hodler (2006), Andersen and Aslaksen (2008), Bhattacharyya
and Hodler (2010), Bjorvatn et al. (2012), Bru¨ckner et al. (2012), Collier and Goderis (2012)
and El Anshasy and Katsaiti (2013), among many others.
Isham et al. (2005), for example, found that not only institutional quality has a signifi-
cant effect on economic growth, but it is also determined by the resource abundance of each
of the countries. According to their results, and in contrast to Sachs and Warner (1995), nat-
ural abundance affects a countrys growth rate solely by influencing its political institutions.
That is, according to these authors, resource abundance has no significant effect on economic
growth once political institutions are taken into account. Hodler (2006), on the other hand,
developed a model in which natural resources cause fighting activities between rivalling groups,
while fighting reduces productive activities and weakens property rights, and thus, production
activities. According to this author, apart from the natural resources’ direct positive income ef-
fect, natural resources have an indirect effect on income through property rights, which depends
on how fractionalized a country is. Mehlum et al. (2006a,b) used the same dataset as Sachs
and Warner (1995), including an interaction effect between quality of institutions and resource
abundance, and obtain that institutional quality is the key to understand the resource curse:
when institutions are bad, resource abundance is a curse, while it is a blessing when institutions
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are good.
All these papers suggest the inclusion of resource abundance and quality of institutions
variables, together with an interaction term between these two variables. This is the approach
that we also take in our proposed PVAR model. Furthermore, based on the probable effect of
economic growth on both resource abundance and quality of institutions, this paper assumes all
the above three variables are endogenous.
Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) analyzed how public income shocks from natural resources
have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional designs. Using data from
90 economies divided into democratic and nondemocratic countries, they find that the form
of government matters more than the democratic rule. Thus, this paper suggests the use of
different variables in order to account for the quality of the institutions, so we include, as well,
different proxies and interaction terms for this variable in our study.
Finally, Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) also analyse both theoretically and empirically
whether and how the quality of the democratic institutions affects the relationship between
natural resources and corruption. Using data for 124 economies that covers the period 1980-
2004, they confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption also depends on
the quality of institutions.
3 Data set and methodology
3.1 Data set
We consider an unbalanced panel of annual data from 76 countries that covers the period 1980-
2012. In total we have 1471 country-year observations. The countries included in our dataset
are listed in Table 1. Table 1 also divides our sample countries into the following subgroups
that we also examine below: developed and developing, oil-importers and oil-exporters and by
different income groups. The variables used in this paper are obtained from the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund (IMF), US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Polity IV
project and Freedom House (see Table 2 for a detailed description of our dataset and their
sources).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
[Insert Table 2 about here]
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Following previous empirical related studies on natural resources that also use panel models
(see, for example, Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010; Boyce and Emery, 2011; Cavalcanti et al.,
2011; Bjorvatn et al., 2012, among others), we propose different specifications of PVAR models.
We collect the following data:
a. Economic growth. Following most of the papers, we use the annual real growth of per capita
GDP as one of our endogenous variables in the analysis, which approximates the degree of the
countries economic development.
b. Oil abundance. We use the following three alternative endogenous variables (for robustness
purposes) as proxies of oil abundance: (i) oil share as a percentage of GDP, (ii) oil rents as a
percentage of GDP and (iii) oil revenues per capita.
c. Quality of political institutions. Again, for robustness purposes, we use two alternative
measures of political institutional quality: (i) Polity IV index from the Polity IV project (Mar-
shall Monty et al., 2009) and (ii) Political Rights index (from the Freedom House). The Polity
IV index is a commonly used proxy for institutional quality in several studies (see, for example
Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010; Arezki and Bru¨ckner, 2011; Bjorvatn et al., 2012; Bru¨ckner
et al., 2012; El Anshasy and Katsaiti, 2013; Boschini et al., 2013; Caselli and Tesei, 2016). The
Political Rights index also approximates the quality of institutions, although it is constructed
based on the responses to different questions related to the electoral process, political pluralism
and participation and functioning of government, and it has also been used in the literature (see,
e.g., Arezki and Bru¨ckner, 2011).
d. Interaction terms. Economic and political science literature tend to include an interactive
term between the quality of institutions and natural resource abundance or share. In particular,
we use the following two interaction terms: (i) between the level of democracy and oil abun-
dance and (ii) among the level of democracy, constraints to the executive and oil abundance,
so as to account for the interdependencies among the quality of political institutions, economic
growth and oil abundance. Previous studies that used similar proxies are Andersen and Aslaksen
(2008), Alexeev and Conrad (2009), Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), Bjorvatn et al. (2012),
El Anshasy and Katsaiti (2013) and Boschini et al. (2013). This is the third endogenous variable
that we use in the extended PVAR model version, as discussed below.
e. Exogenous control variables. In order to avoid any potential omitted variable bias, we also
control for several exogenous variables typically used in the endogenous growth theory, namely,
labour force participation, gross fixed capital formation and openness.
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3.2 PVAR
This paper uses data from 76 economies for the period 1980-2012. The PVAR methodology we
employ, originally developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), extends the traditional VAR model
introduced by Sims (1980), which treats all the variables in the system as endogenous, with the
panel-data approach, which allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity. In its general form,
the PVAR model can be expressed as follows:
Yit = A0 +A1Yit−1 +A2Yit−2 + ...+AjYit−j +BXit + µi + λt + εit (1)
where Yit is a vector of our endogenous variables, namely real per capita economic growth and
oil abundance (proxied by either oil share as a % of GDP, oil rents or oil revenue per capita).
The autoregressive structure allows all endogenous variables to enter the model with a number
of j lags. Xit is a vector of the exogenous variables (commonly used in endogenous growth
models) comprising: (i) gross fixed capital formation as a % of GDP, measuring capital input,
(ii) imports plus exports as a % of GDP, capturing the degree of openness, and (iii) labour force
participation, capturing human capital. µi accounts for the unobservable country characteristics
(country fixed-effects) and λt accounts for any global shocks that may affect all countries in the
same way (time fixed-effects). Finally, εit denotes the error term.
As indicated above, our benchmark specification is a bivariate PVAR that contains the real
per capita GDP growth rate and a proxy of oil abundance, as well as exogenous variables and
country- and time-fixed-effects. However, we also extend this model to a trivariate PVAR with
the inclusion of an interaction term (either INTER 1 or INTER 2; as defined in Table 2) so as
to capture the effects of the quality of political institutions on the resource course hypothesis.
Thus, we allow for all these variables to be endogenous, addressing one of the main empirical
problems of the related literature.
In fact, as a first step, and in order to justify the methodology used in this paper, we pursued
Block exogeneity tests, as a test for the endogeneity/exogeneity of the key variables in the study.
A variable is said to Granger cause another variable if there is enough evidence to reject the
null hypothesis that the coefficients on the lags of the vector of variables Ykt−j in the PVAR
equation of Yit, where i 6= k, are all equal to zero. The results of this test reported in Table 3,
provide evidence of causality among the three variables (i.e., economic growth, oil abundance
and quality of institutions), suggesting that these variables should be treated as endogenous.4
4The Granger-causality results for the subsample groups, which are qualitatively similar, are available from
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This is the approach that we follow in this study.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
In order to get a more complete picture of the dynamic interactions among oil abundance,
economic growth and political institutions, we perform a panel generalised impulse-response
function (PGIRF) analysis, in order to assess the speed of adjustments to shocks originating
in our aforementioned variables. The panel generalised impulse response function analysis em-
ployed, which is based on Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), provides a natural
solution when theory does not provide a clear cut guidance on the identification of the aforemen-
tioned endogenous variables, as discussed above. Moreover, the PGIRFs are also decomposed
into the responses of shocks to specific variables by taking out from the PGIRFs the effects
of shocks to all other variables (Koop et al., 1996), which gives us further insights into the
mechanisms at work.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Descriptive statistics and causality tests
In Table 4, we present the descriptive statistics of our main variables for the full data sample (i.e.,
76 countries between 1980 and 2012). It is evident from this table that, real GDP per capita
growth averaged at 1.67% and the oil abundance variables averaged between 8.40%-10.09%.
Compared to real GDP per capita growth, the oil abundance variables are more volatile. On
average, the countries in the sample are characterised by high degree of openness (72.04%),
abundant human capital (59.87%) and moderate capital input (21.91%). According to the
panel unit root test, all series are stationary, indicating the appropriateness of using them in
the PVAR analysis.5
[Insert Table 4 about here]
4.2 Panel Generalised Impulse Response Functions: Full sample analysis
Based on the estimation of Equation (1), with a lag order of 4 determined by the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), we first calculate the generalised
the authors upon request.
5The results for the subgroups of countries and proxies of oil abundance and institutional quality, point towards
similar conclusions. Thus, for the sake of brevity, these are not presented but are available upon request from the
authors.
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panel impulse response functions tracing out the reaction of real per capita GDP growth to a
shock on oil share and vice versa.
Figure 1 (Panel A) depicts the dynamic path of adjustment to a shock on oil share in
year 1 and in subsequent periods (up to 15 years) based on a PVAR model with only these
two endogenous variables, as well as the exogenous variables (i.e., labour force participation,
openness and gross fixed capital formation).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Our results indicate that oil share tends to have a positive effect on per capita real GDP
growth in the long-run (up to 15 years). Specifically, the effect is marginally significant from
the 9th year onwards. Furthermore, we observe that a positive shock to the per capita real
GDP growth triggers a positive response from the oil share, yet only short-lived (up to 2 years),
as it becomes insignificant thereafter. This is suggestive of the fact that, based on the full
sample estimation, higher levels of oil share lead to higher economic growth, contrary to the
empirical evidence of the resource curse hypothesis (as in Raddatz, 2007; Alexeev and Conrad,
2009; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). In addition, we report for the first time that there is a
feedback mechanism from economic growth to the oil share, which might suggest that economic
growth could lead to better exploitation of oil resources and thus increase the oil share for a
country, which points again to the endogeneity of the oil abundance variables in this type of
studies (Collier and Goderis, 2012).
In order to analyse the role of the institutions, we estimate the previous PVAR model
distinguishing between democratic and autocratic countries, with the use of the first interaction
term (INTER 1; as defined in Table 2), and the results are displayed in Panel B of Figure
2. Interestingly enough, the response of per capita real GDP growth to a positive shock to oil
share, considering only the autocracies, is still positive, however, only in the short-run. This fact
suggests that oil share has a higher positive effect on economic growth in democratic rather than
in autocratic countries. Similarly, a positive shock to economic growth is not translated into a
positive response from the oil share of the autocracies, as evident by the insignificant response
of INTER 1 to a per capita real GDP growth shock. Even though we do not report a negative
relationship between oil share and economic growth for the non-democratic countries (as in Sachs
and Warner, 1999, 2001; Gylfason et al., 1999; Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999), this finding allows
us to confirm the resource curse hypothesis and the role of the institutions in explaining the oil
dependence and economic growth relationship (as in Isham et al., 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006a,b).
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Although the findings for the resource curse hypothesis have been previously reported, we also
show for the first time that the reverse causality is still evident, yet only for democracies. Thus,
the role of institutions in explaining the positive significant relationship from economic growth
to oil rents adds a new channel through which institutions should be considered when analysing
the resource curse hypothesis.
Next, we assess whether the results are different when we take into consideration the degree of
constraints on the executive (as approximated by the xrreg variable; as defined in Table 2). This
is rather important as there are cases where countries are autocratic, yet with strong constraints
on the executive, which reduces the powers of the autocrat and thus, these economies may be
closer to be democracies. An example of such country is Indonesia, where during the mid-60s
Suharto overruled Sukarno with coups d’e´tat, yet he was committed to maintain the property
rights and investments of the business sector. During Suhartos era the country experienced
significant growth with heavy investments in public goods and numerous reforms in the banking
sector, as well as, in import trade monopolies (Hadiz and Robison, 2005).
To capture the effects of these constraints we employ our second interaction term (INTER 2;
as defined in Table 2). The results are reported in Panel C of Figure 1. We notice, that the
response of the economic growth to a positive shock to oil share, given an autocracy with high
constraints on the executive (INTER 2), is of higher magnitude compared to the response to
INTER 1. However, the effect is of lower magnitude (and limited to a shorter time period)
than the obtained in Panel A, suggesting again that the positive relationship between oil share
and economic growth is higher for democratic countries and countries with constraints to the
executive. This result justifies again the inclusion of quality of institutions as a channel through
which oil rents may influence economic growth (Mehlum et al., 2006a,b). In addition, the oil
share for those autocracies with high constraints to the executive responds positively to an
economic shock, as evident by the right PGIRF of Panel C.
4.3 Panel Generalised Impulse Response Functions: Subgroup analysis
In this section we analyse the robustness of our results by means of estimating previous specifi-
cations of the PVAR for different subgroups of countries (as classified in Table 1).
First, we estimate the PVAR model for net oil-importing and net oil-exporting countries and
display the results in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. The results from Panels A of Figures 2 and
3 suggest that oil share is growth-enhancing especially for net oil-exporting countries.
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[Insert Figure 2 about here]
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
When we include the first interaction term (INTER 1) in the PVAR specification, we again
find that for net oil-importing countries, oil share does not have any effects on economic growth
in non-democratic countries and the same holds even if we account for the constraints to the
executive (INTER 2) (see Panels B and C in Figure 2). Furthermore, as expected we do not
find any response from interaction terms to economic growth shocks.
Turning our attention to the net oil-exporter countries (see Panels B and C in Figure 3)
we uncover the following empirical regularities. First, shocks to oil share are growth-enhancing
for autocracies, only if constraints to the executive exist. Nevertheless, the positive response
observed in Panel C is still short-lived (i.e., lasts for about 4 years). Thus, the long-run effects of
oil share to economic growth are mainly observed for democratic net oil-exporters. To conclude
our analysis for the net oil-exporters and oil-importers, we document a positive response of the oil
share to economic growth shocks only for the case of net oil-exporters and only when we consider
the second interaction term (INTER 2). This is also suggestive of the fact that autocratic regimes
are not capable in boosting oil shares even if they experience economic growth.
We also analyse the resource curse hypothesis by distinguishing between developing and
developed countries, and display the results in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. As shown in the
Panels A of Figures 4 and 5, oil share leads to higher growth in both developing and developed
countries, although this effect is of a lower magnitude for the developed countries (see left
PGIRFs of Panels A of Figures 4 and 5). This is rather expected given that the oil sector in
the developed countries may not be a key sector for the economic, whereas the reverse is true
for the developing economics. Indicatively, the oil revenues in Venezuela account for about 25%
of the countrys GDP and 95% of its exports, whereas for the UK, the same ratios are about 1.2
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Again, when we include the interaction terms, INTER 1 and INTER 2, in the PVAR specifi-
cation, we find that oil share has a low positive (zero) effect on the economic growth of autocracies
(see left PGIRFs in Panels B and C of Figures 4 and 5). In addition, we observe no significant
response from the oil share in the autocratic countries to positive economic shocks (this holds
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for both developed and developing countries). The only exemption is the positive response of
the oil share to economic growth shocks for the autocracies with high levels of constraints.
Finally, we control for the income group (low/medium-low, medium-high and high income
countries) when analysing the resource curse hypothesis. The results are shown in Figures 6, 7
and 8.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
We find evidence of heterogeneous responses among the different income groups. In particu-
lar, there is no significant relationship between oil share and economic growth in the low/medium-
low income group and this finding is robust even when we consider the two alternative interaction
terms (see Figure 6).
Turning to the medium-high income group of countries we document that the positive long
run effects of oil share are mainly driven by democratic countries (left PGIRFs in Panels A and
B in Figure 7) or by autocracies that have in place significant constraints to the executive (see
left PGIRF in Panel C of Figure 7). The reverse causality (i.e. from the economic growth to oil
share) does not exist for this income group.
More importantly, we find bidirectional relationship between oil share and economic growth
for the high-income countries group, although these effects are short-lived. This finding holds
true for all specifications.
Overall, our results suggest that controlling for the quality of political institutions is im-
portant in rendering the resource course hypothesis significant. Doing so, the resource curse
hypothesis is documented mainly for developing economies, net oil-exporters and medium-high
income countries. Specifically, when economies from the aforementioned groups are characterised
by weak quality of political institutions (autocracies with limited constraints to the executive),
oil abundance is not growth-enhancing. This might suggest that these autocrats or the political
elite exploit the benefits of the countrys oil resources to accommodate their own rent-seeking
behaviour, without considering the potential positive long-run benefits to the wider economy.6
6Last but not least, our main results are robust to different proxies of oil abundance, economic growth (growth
rates, GDP per capita growth, 5-year period growth rates) and quality of political institutions (polity index and
the freedom house political rights index). For the sake of brevity we do not report these results, which are,
however, available upon request from the authors.
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Gylfason (2001), for example, argues that nations that consider their natural resources to be
their most important asset may neglect the development of other resources, such as educa-
tion. However, the existence of high-quality institutions (those able to create positive incentives
for entrepreneurial growth) is crucial to translate the benefits from oil to productive activities
(Mehlum et al., 2006a,b).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we shed more light to the contested literature on the resource curse hypothesis,
by estimating a panel VAR approach along with panel generalised impulse response functions
(PGIRFs) to data on oil abundance, economic growth and several political institutional variables
for 76 countries grouped under different income groupings, level of development and oil import-
ing or exporting status, over the period 1980-2012. To our knowledge, this is the first paper
that adopts a PVAR and PGIRFs analyses, to study the impact of oil abundance on economic
growth taking into account the endogeneity of institutional quality, as well as controlling for
commonly used indicators in the growth literature in order to shed more light into the natural
resource curse hypothesis. The use of this methodology allow us to control for cross-country
unobservable heterogeneity, account for time fixed-effects, analyse the dynamic relationship be-
tween the different variables, and most importantly, to address the endogeneity problem often
found in these type of studies.
The results of our empirical analysis reveal the following regularities. First, we document
the need of considering per capita real GDP growth, oil abundance and quality institutions as
endogenous variables, which justifies the use of panel VAR models in analyzing the relation-
ship between these variables. Second, we find significant evidence that positive oil share shocks
are growth-enhancing, when we do not account for institutional quality, suggesting thus, evi-
dence against the resource curse hypothesis in that case. Third, controlling for the quality of
political institutions seems important in rendering the resource course hypothesis significant.
Doing so, the resource curse hypothesis is documented mainly for developing economies, net
oil-exporters and medium-high income countries. Specifically, when economies from the afore-
mentioned groups are characterised by weak quality of political institutions, then oil abundance
is not growth-enhancing.
These results are robust to different proxies of oil abundance, economic growth (overall GDP
growth, 5-year period growth rates) and quality of political institutions (polity index and the
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freedom house political rights index).
Overall, our findings, based on the suggested dynamic approach that deals with a number of
issues in the estimation process, provide new insights in the resource curse hypothesis. Moreover,
our analysis shows that the resource curse hypothesis is mainly driven by the quality of political
institutions, as well as, the constraints imposed to the executives. This suggests that the natural
resource hypothesis hold true for autocracies with limited constraints to the executive.
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Table 1: Countries included in the sample
Panel A: Income Groups
Low and Medium-Low Income
Bangladesh Bolivia Cameroon Congo Brazzaville
Congo (Dem Rep) Egypt Ghana Guatemala
India Indonesia Nigeria Pakistan
Paraguay Philippines Syria Vietnam
Yemen
Medium-High Income
Albania Algeria Angola Argentina
Bulgaria China Colombia Cuba
Dominican Rep Ecuador Gabon Hungary
Iran Iraq Jordan Libya
Malaysia Mexico Peru Romania
Thailand Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey
Venezuela
High Income
Australia Austria Bahrain Belgium
Brazil Canada Chile Denmark
Finland France Germany Greece
Ireland Israel Italy Japan
Kuwait New Zealand Norway Netherlands
Oman Poland Portugal Qatar
Korea South Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore
Spain Sweden Switzerland United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom United States
Panel B: Level of Development
Developed
Australia Austria Bahrain Belgium
Canada Chile Denmark Finland
France Germany Greece Ireland
Israel Italy Japan Kuwait
New Zealand Norway Netherlands Oman
Poland Portugal Qatar Korea South
Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Spain
Sweden Switzerland Trinidad and Tobago United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom United States
Developing
Albania Algeria Angola Argentina
Bangladesh Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria
Cameroon China Colombia Congo Brazzaville
Congo (Dem Rep) Cuba Dominican Rep Ecuador
Egypt Gabon Ghana Guatemala
Hungary India Indonesia Iran
Iraq Jordan Libya Malaysia
Mexico Nigeria Pakistan Paraguay
Peru Philippines Romania Syria
Thailand Tunisia Turkey Venezuela
Vietnam Yemen
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Table 1: Countries included in the sample (cont.)
Panel C: Level of Democracy
Democracies
Albania Algeria Argentina Australia
Austria Belgium Bangladesh Bolivia
Brazil Bulgaria Canada Chile
Colombia Congo (Dem Rep) Denmark Dominican Rep
Ecuador Finland France Gabon
Germany Ghana Greece Guatemala
Hungary India Indonesia Ireland
Iraq Israel Italy Japan
Malaysia Mexico New Zealand Nigeria
Norway Netherlands Pakistan Paraguay
Peru Philippines Poland Portugal
Korea South Romania Russia Spain
Sweden Switzerland Thailand Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey United Kingdom United States
Non-Democracies
Angola Bahrain Cameroon China
Congo Brazzaville Cuba Egypt Iran
Jordan Kuwait Libya Oman
Qatar Saudi Arabia Singapore Syria
Tunisia United Arab Emirates Venezuela Vietnam
Yemen
Panel D: Oil Importers and Oil Exporters
Net Oil-Importers
Albania Australia Austria Belgium
Bangladesh Brazil Bulgaria Chile
China Cuba Denmark Dominican Rep
Finland France Germany Ghana
Greece Guatemala Hungary India
Indonesia Ireland Israel Italy
Jordan Japan New Zealand Netherlands
Pakistan Paraguay Peru Philippines
Poland Portugal Korea South Romania
Singapore Spain Sweden Switzerland
Thailand Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey
United Kingdom United States Vietnam
Net Oil-Exporters
Algeria Angola Argentina Bahrain
Bolivia Canada Cameroon Colombia
Congo Brazzaville Congo (Dem Rep) Ecuador Egypt
Gabon Iran Iraq Kuwait
Libya Malaysia Mexico Nigeria
Norway Oman Qatar Russia
Saudi Arabia Syria United Arab Emirates Venezuela
Yemen
21
Table 2: Variable description and sources
Name Description Source Notes
Economic Growth rate of real per IMF Log difference of per capita GDP (in PPP,
Growth capita GDP (GDPPCGR) constant 2005 intnl $)
Oil rents Oil rents (as % of GDP) World Bank Difference between the value of crude oil
production at world prices and total costs
of production
Oil share Oil share (as % of GDP) IMF, EIA Value of crude oil exports as % of GDP.
Oil revenue Oil revenue per capita IMF, EIA Value of crude oil exports per capita
Polity IV Rating based on a +10 Polity IV Substracting the AUTOC score from the
(strongly democratic) to project DEMOC score in the Polity IV database
-10 (strongly autocratic)
scale
Xrreg Rating based on a 1 to 3 Polity IV It is a component of the Polity IV index, and
scale project measures the “Regulation of Chief Executive
Recruitment” mechanism
Political Rating based on a 1 to 7 Freedom The ratings process is based on a checklist of
rights scale House 10political rights questions related to the
electoral process, political pluralism and
participation and functioning of government
Democracy Dummy variable Polity IV Countries are classified according to the
status project Polity IV index in democracies (Polity IV
scores between 6 and 10), and anocracies/
autocracies (Polity IV scores between -10
and 5)
Democracy Interactive term IMF, EIA, Calculated as the product of Democracy status
status × (INTER 1) Polity IV and Oil share
Oil share
Political rights Interactive term IMF, EIA, Calculated as the product of Political rights
× Oil share (INTER 1a) Freedom and Oil share
House
Democracy Interactive term World Bank, Calculated as the product of Democracy status
status × (INTER 1b) Polity IV and Oil rents
Oil rents
Political rights Interactive term World Bank, Calculated as the product of Political rights
× Oil rents (INTER 1c) Freedom and Oil rents
House
Democracy Interactive term IMF, EIA, Calculated as the product of Democracy status
status × (INTER 1d) Polity IV and Oil revenue
Oil revenue
Note: Annual data from 76 countries for the period 1980-2012.
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Table 2: Variable description and sources (cont.)
Name Description Source Notes
Political rights Interactive term IMF, EIA, Calculated as the product of Political rights
× Oil revenue (INTER 1e) Freedom and Oil revenue
House
Democracy Interactive term IMF, EIA, Calculated as the product of Democracy status,
status × (INTER 2) Polity IV Oil share and xrreg
Oil share
× xrreg
Political rights Interactive term IMF, EIA, Calculated as the product of Political rights,
× Oil share (INTER 2a) Freedom Oil share and xrreg
× xrreg House
Democracy Interactive term World Bank, Calculated as the product of Democracy status,
status × Oil (INTER 2b) Polity IV Oil rents and xrreg
rents × xrreg
Political rights Interactive term World Bank, Calculated as the product of Political rights,
× Oil rents (INTER 2c) Freedom Oil rents and xrreg
× xrreg House
Democracy Interactive term IMF, EIA, Calculated as the product of Democracy status,
status × Oil (INTER 2d) Polity IV Oil revenue and xrreg
revenue × xrreg
Political rights Interactive term IMF, EIA, Calculated as the product of Political rights,
× Oil revenue (INTER 2e) Freedom Oil revenue and xrreg
× xrreg House
Developing Category World Bank Countries are classified according to their degree
of development, based on World Bank data
Oil importer/ Category World Bank Countries are classified according to their net oil
Exporter importer or exporter status, based on World Bank data
GFCF Gross fixed capital World Bank Expressed as percentage of GDP
formation
Trade openness Trade openness World Bank The sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP
LPFR Labour force World Bank Expressed as a percentage of total population of ages
participation rate 15+
Note: Annual data from 76 countries for the period 1980-2012.
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Table 3: Block exogeneity/Granger-causality tests
Dependent variable
Economic growth Oil share INTER 1
rate
Economic growth 11.55** 3.40
rate (excluded)
Oil share (excluded) 16.38*** 13.55***
INTER 1 (excluded) 10.04** 6.19
All variables 28.34*** 17.44** 15.17*
Economic growth Oil share INTER 2
rate
Economic growth 10.87** 1.71
rate (excluded)
Oil share (excluded) 13.83*** 13.21**
INTER 2 (excluded) 8.55* 2.93
All variables 24.53*** 14.57* 14.27*
Note: The numbers in the table are the Chi-square block exogeneity Wald tests. Under the null hypothesis, the
excluded variables do not Granger-cause the dependent variable. *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Mean Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis J-B LLC
GDPPCGR 1.6688 -43.0161 40.5673 4.5809 -1.2640 14.4295 13194.21* -20.93*
OIL SHARE 8.4982 0.0000 98.8086 14.4599 3.0219 14.0225 9685.52* -28.07*
OIL RENT 10.0863 0.0000 80.2375 14.9963 1.8375 5.8979 1852.66* -24.53*
OIL REVENUE 8.4171 0.0001 245.0232 20.1332 5.8563 50.3884 154090.8* -27.17*
GFCF 21.9134 2.1000 59.7324 6.1869 0.5755 5.2960 618.13* -4.80*
OPENESS 72.0425 6.3203 439.6567 49.4087 3.1378 18.3525 26877.76* -39.86*
LPFR 59.8670 15 86.7 9.5022 -0.2659 3.3369 41.4322* -5.61*
Note: * denotes significance at the 1% level. J-B denotes the Jarque-Bera test for normality. LLC is the panel
unit root test (with just a constant) of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), which test the null hypothesis of a unit root,
against the alternative that the panel is stationary.
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions: Full sample
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions: Net oil-importers
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions: Net oil-exporters
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions: Developing
Panel A: No interaction term 
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
.12
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Accumulated Response of GDPPCGR to OIL_SHARE
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Accumulated Response of OIL_SHARE to GDPPCGR
Accumulated Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Panel B: Interaction between level of democracy and oil share (INTER_1) 
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Accumulated Response of GDPPCGR to INTER_1
-.1
.0
.1
.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Accumulated Response of INTER_1 to GDPPCGR
Accumulated Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Panel C: Interaction between level of democracy, oil share and xrreg (INTER_2) 
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Accumulated Response of GDPPCGR to INTER_2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Accumulated Response of INTER_2 to GDPPCGR
Accumulated Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
28
Figure 5: Impulse response functions: Developed
Panel A: No interaction term 
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions: Low and Medium-Low Income group
Panel A: No interaction term 
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions: Medium-High Income group
Panel A: No interaction term 
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions: High Income group
Panel A: No interaction term 
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